Competing institutional logics and cooperation within local activation policy

Abstract

Interagency cooperation is described by policymakers as a solution to various problems within the activation policy aimed at unemployed. We problematize this by using the theory of competing institutional logics. The aim is to understand local activation policy by studying cooperation between municipalities. We have conducted eleven group interviews with local managers of the Public Employment Service, the municipal social assistance unit and the municipal labour market unit. The results show that cooperation is difficult due to competing institutional logics. However, cooperation as hybrid logic can to some degree handle the competing logics, using shared points of departure. One example is a joint dependency between the organizations. There are few and weak regulations that can help the Public Employment Service and the municipality to cooperate. The weak and vague rules forced the organizations to negotiate in every municipality. This makes the content of Swedish activation policy random, unclear and heavily dependent on local arbitrariness. But, while cooperation can solve problems within activation, it also can reproduce inequality. Those who depend on local activation, among whom poor, long-term unemployed, people with disabilities and non-native born Swedes are over-represented, risk having weak rights and the effectiveness of the policy can be questioned.